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Recent Developments in the Kentucky Law of Wills1949-1954
By FRmERc W. WHITESME JR.* and JAmEs S.

KOSTAS*

Recent Kentucky case law in the field of wills has generally
applied existing law but has not effected many startling developments of new principles. It is the purpose of this article to survey
the developments in this field in Kentucky within the past five
years. Wherever appropriate, citations will be given to articles
appearing in past issues of the Kentucky Law Journaland to companion articles in this issue.
PART I-WILLS
What instruments are testamentary: It is well settled that an
instrument labelled as a deed or trust may really be testamentary
in character in that it attempts to do what a will normally does
and will, therefore, be held invalid in the absence of compliance
with the formalities of the Statute of Wills. While a living trust
created inter vivos by the settlor is valid as a trust even if it reserves the income to the settlor for life and is completely revocable, a present interest must be created in order to be upheld as
a trust. In one interesting case' the Kentucky Court of Appeals
upheld a living trust against a contention that it was testamentary
and therefore invalid for lack of the formalities required of a will.
The settlor had reserved rather substantial powers of direction
* A.B., University of Arkansas; LL.B., Cornell University. Member of Arkansas, Kentucky and New York Bars. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
* Editor-in-Chief, Kentucky Law Journal. A.B., University of Southern
California.
'Stouse v. First National Bank of Chicago, 245 S.W. 2d 91 (Ky. 1952).
Another interesting point which arose in the same case involved instruments
amending the trust, but which apparently wvere given effect as wills (or instru-

ments disposing of property at death), in view of the fact that a will executed
of even date with the original trust was permitted to leave the residue of the
estate to the trust according to its terms as amended. In holding this gift by will
to the trust as amended to be valid the court pointed out that the trust amendments contained the two witnesses requisite for compliance with the requirements
for a will. For a discussion of a further problem relating to whether a will is valid
insofar as it incorporates the provisions of, or leaves property to, a trust which is
or may be amended after the execution of the will, see the note by Wilkerson,
Testamentary Gifts to Amendable Trusts, infra this volume, 42 Ky. L. J. 702
(1954).
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over the trustees in the management of the trust property (in addition to full power to revoke or amend and the retention of income for his life). The general principle was enunciated that in
order to make the trust testamentary there must be reserved in
the settlor such power of control of the details of administration
that the trustee is in effect the mere agent of the settlor. Reservation of income plus the right of revocation are alone insufficient.'
Although the instant trust came close to the line in that some of
the enumerated powers of the trustees, (such as to invest, to acquire and lease real estate, to borrow money and to vote stock)
could be exercised only upon written instructions of the settlor,
the court found that the latter had not retained the power to deal
with the property as she pleased, the power to prescribe the details of administration nor the right to possession. Thus it was not
a disposition operative at death but a valid inter vivos trust.
The converse proposition states that an instrument purporting
to be a will and complying with the requisite formalities is still
not entitled to probate as a will unless it is really testamentary in
character. In line with this general principle, one recent case
points out that an essential element of a will is an actual disposition of property, and that a properly executed holographic will
in the form of a signed statement merely reciting that decedent
had turned over properties to decedent's son in full payment of
the son's share in the estate of decedent's husband was not entitled
to probate as a will.8
One sad illustration of the danger of a home-made will instead
of a lawyer-made will came before the Court. The would-be
testatrix tried to set out her wishes for disposal of her property
upon her death in an holographic document, but the court was
unable to unravel the "mammoth puzzle" and the will failed in its
entirety. It was impossible to tell who the beneficiaries were, the
extent of the estates devised or the persons in whom the fee was
4
to vest.

What constitutes the will: A will may be written on several
sheets of paper provided that all are intended to operate as the
2

AMRaCAN LAw INsTrrTUTE, RESTAT-MNT OF TRUSTS,

Sec. 57-2;

ATmNsoN

oN WmLs 380 (2d Ed. 1953) I BOGERT ON TRUSTS Am TRUSTEEs, Sees. 103-104

(1935).
'Panke v. Panke, 252 S.W. 2d 909 (Ky. 1952); 260 S.W. 2d 397 (1953).
'Johnson v. Johnson, 312 Ky. 773, 229 S.W. 2d 743 (1950).
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will and provided further that all the papers intended to be integrated into the will are present at the time of execution. 5 Recently restated by the Kentucky court were the related principles
that the will together with all codicils must be construed as a
unit,6 that inconsistent provisions of the will must yield to a later
codicil,7 and that a codicil republishes the previous will as modi-

fied by the codicil.8
The court also held, in Hurley v. Blankinship,9 that a codicil
may operate to republish and validate a will previously invalid
due to alteration after execution, testamentary incapacity, undue
influence or the like. The case permitted an holographic writing,
invalid for lack of a signature, to be given life by a properly
executed codicil. Perhaps the same result could have been
reached by the court on the theory that the so-called codicil
operated as a will which incorporated by reference the unsigned
paper already in existence and described as such therein. On the

facts of this case such a theory could be reconciled with the accepted Kentucky law that the doctrine of incorporation by reference cannot be applied in cases involving holographic instruments, that is, when the holographic will attempts to incorporate
a typewritten or other statement the latter does not meet the requirement of the statutory definition of an holographic will as one
wholly in the testator's own handwriting.' 0
Contracts to will: A recent case applied the rule that an oral
contract to devise or bequeth property by will is enforceable when
supported by consideration and convincing evidence of the contract." The testimony of the promisee was unchallenged, and the
5

177-183 (2d Ed. 1953).
Bogie v. Britton, 258 S.W. 2d 898 (Ky. 1953).
'Stark v. Gibbons, 259 S.W. 2d 36 (Ky. 1953).
8
ibid.
0
Hurley v. Blankinship, 313 Ky. 49, 229 S.W. 2d 963 (1950). An interesting
sidepoint in this case is the court's indulgence in an assumption, without deciding
the point, that the first holographic document may have been insufficient as to
signature although the very last sentence contained the following in testator's
handwriting: 'Written by the hand of R. F. Blankinship." Cf. Bamberger v. Barbour, 385 Ill.
458, 167 N.E. 2d 122 (1929) (No sufficient signature where the
name was written in exordium clause at beginning of an holographic paper.)
'oSharp v. Wallace, 83 Ky. 584 (1886).
Finn v. Finn's Adm'r, 244 S.W. 2d 435 (Ky., 1951); Accord: Watts v.
Mahon, 264 S.W. 2d 627 (Ky. 1954). These holdings are of course reconcilable
with the principle that a verbal agreement cannot be used as part of a will or to
vary its terms. See Haysley v. Rogers, 255 S.W. 2d 649 (Ky. 1952) (oral wish
that donee do something with property following legatee's death did not cut down
on donees fee simple estate). Cf. the prior cases of Maloney v. Maloney, 258 Ky.
ATKINSON ON WILLS
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court considered that the exclusion of the heirs in return for a
home and the companionship of the promisee during the decedent's lifetime was not an unnatural disposition in view of the
fact that the only heirs were distant cousins who showed up only
after the testator's death. The particular oral contract in that
case was upheld against a contention that the requirement of a
writing for a "sale" of real property was applicable.
It might be noted, however, that any contract to will property
will be held subject to the right of a wife to her dower interest in
land and her statutory share in personal property. This was recently held to be the case in interesting litigation, even though
the contract to will was in writing and by court record made a
part of a divorce settlement and incorporated into the divorce
decree, where the second wife did not have actual knowledge of
the previous contract to will or of the decree of the divorce court
approving such contract.'2
In one case involving a joint will by husband and wife, executed pursuant to a contract whereby each was to leave his property to the other and at the death of both to the plaintiff, the
court refused to enforce a trust in favor of the plaintiff where the
wife had destroyed the joint will upon her husband's death. 3
The reason given was failure of the petition to allege that the
husband continued to recognize the will up to the time of his
death, and the case is therefore explainable as an illustration of
the principle that the inability to produce a will must be explained and non-revocation shown.
567, 80 S.W. 2d 611 (1935) and Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S.W. 2d
985 (1932). The Court of Appeals seems to recognize, however, that where the
parties pursuant to a contract actually do execute a formal joint will there is a
sufficient monument to the agreement, and the estate may be impressed with a
trust for the use and benefit of the legatees in the joint will. Watkins v. Covington
Trust and Banking Co., 303 Ky. 644, 198 S.W. 2d 964 (1947); Epley v. Epley,
251 S.W. 2d 451 (Ky. 1952).
" Wides v. Wides Ex'r, 299 Ky. 103, 184 S.W. 2d 579 (1944). The widow's
adversaries in this case then moved the circuit court to take evidence on the
question of whether or not the widow had actual knowledge of the contract or
the decree of divorce. On appeal from the court's refusal to do so, the Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that although it did not rule in the earlier appeal that
knowledge by the second wife was immaterial, here the controlling factor was the
policy of the law to protect the widow in securing her distributable share in her
husband's estate. Wides v. Wides Ex'r, 300 Ky. 344, 188 S.W. 2d 471 (1945).
Thus, although the widow's knowledge or lack of it is said to be "a matter of
considerable equity" it apparently will not be considered sufficient to deprive her
of her distributable share in her husband's estate.
" Romans v. Belcher, 251 S.W. 2d 453 (Ky. 1952).
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Probate Procedures: The matter of probate procedures in
Kentucky is dealt with in a note, infra this issue, 14 and will not be
discussed here.
Execution: With regard to statutory formalities on such matters as the testator's signature, the number and competency and
order of signing of witnesses, publication, etc., there are no significant new developments. Several recent cases involved the
testator's signature. 5
Another case involved the requirement that the testator sign
in the presence of witnesses in an unusual situation in which two
joint testators signed the same will. The will was held improperly
executed because one of the two joint testators had not signed in
the presence of the subscribing witnesses. 16
The meaning of the requirement of acknowledgment was dealt
with in two rather interesting cases. In Barton's Adm'r v. Barton'7 the Kentucky Court of Appeals reiterated the proposition
that K.R.S. 894.040 specifically refers to the will and not to the
signature as the subject of acknowledgment by the testator. The
court appeared to take a rather lax attitude in the Barton case.
There the subscribing witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other. Nor did the testator sign the will in the
presence of either of the witnesses, although it was shown that
he had signed the will in the proper place before either of the
witnesses had subscribed their names. The court held it was sufficient that he had acknowledged to each of them that it was his
will, saying that:
"42 Ky. L. J. 709 (1954).
Georgetown College, Inc. v. Webb, 313 Ky. 25, 230 S.W. 2d 84 (1950)
(Two documents in testator's handwriting and styled "codicils" were not given
effect as such since they were not signed and hence did not comply with Ky.REV.
STAT. 394.040); Cline v. Wenger, 263 S.W. 2d 91 (Ky. 1953) (Testimony of
contestant, a banker and a handwriting expert, that testator's signature was a
forgery was held merely to create a suspicion and was not enough to overcome
the testator
positiveintestimony
of four Johnson
by
unimpeached
witnesses
will (Ky.
was signed
their presence);
v. Johnson,
257 that
S.W. the
2d 533
1953)
(The testimony of two sons of a deceased attesting witness that their father's signature was not genuine, and the testimon), of the cashier of the bank where
testator
permitted
his banking
to done
overcome
that of that
the the
sole signature
surviving on the will was not testator's was
mony ofhad
te
wife
principal
beneficiary). witness and the incomplete testiSPotts
Ad'm. ofv. the
Commonwealth
ex rel. Reeves, 312 Ky. 845, 229 S.W. 2d
990
(1950).
'244 5.W. 2d 770 (Ky. 1951).
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To execute a valid will it is not essential that the testator
subscribe his name to the instrument in the presence of the
attesting witnesses; it is sufficient
if he acknowledge the will
8
before the two witnesses.1
In an earlier case 9 the court held that K.R.S. 894.040 had
not been complied with where neither of the witnesses saw the
testator sign the will although both testified that his signature
was on the will at the time they signed. Although the language
used here seems to conflict with the holding in the Barton case it
is probable that the controlling factor here was that one of the
witnesses had not been requested by the testator to sign, nor had
the latter acknowledged to him that it was his will.
Mental capacity: The general requirements for capacity necessary to make a will have been well stated.2 0 A testator may be
held to have understanding of the nature and natural objects of
his bounty and be able to understand the relationship of these
elements to each other to a degree sufficient to make an orderly
disposition of his property even though he has to have a guardian
to manage his estate.' Mere failure of memory, momentary forgetfulnes, or lack of strict coherence in conversation does not
render one incapable of executing a will.22 If this be all that is
shown the court should direct a verdict for the proponents of the
will. There must be substantialevidence in order to take the case
to the jury. Where no more than a "scintilla of evidence" has
been introduced the court will direct a verdict for the proponents.2 3
If a will is unnatural and inconsistent with the testator's obligations to his family, the propounders have the burden of giving
24
reasonable explanation therefor.
Two cases have involved the duty of the jury or of the court
when sitting without a jury. The general rule was reiterated that
I1d. at 772. Cf. Pott's Ad'm. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Reeves, 312 Ky. 845,
229 S.W. 2d 990 (1950).
"Lowrance v. Moreland, 310 Ky. 533, 221 S.W. 2d 649 (1949).
IBATKaNSON ON WILLS

A.L.R. 281.
ATKxNSON ON WmLs

228-253 (2d Ed. 1953); 27 Ky. L. J.224 (1939); 155
239 (2d Ed. 1953); Green, The Operative Effect of

Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills, 21 Txx. L. REV. 554, 584 (1943);
Note, 18 TuIrANE L. REv. 620 (1944).
Tye v. Tye, 312 Ky. 812, 229 S.W. 2d 973 (1950).
Bennett v. Kissinger, 313 Ky. 417, 231 S.W. 2d 74 (1950).
" Pardue v. Pardue, 312 Ky. 370, 227 S.W. 2d 403 (1950).
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when there is a conflict in testimony of a great number of witnesses on both sides, the question of mental capacity is for the
juryY When sitting without a jury the decision of the court will
not be disturbed unless it is not sustained by the evidence or is
26
arrived at as a result of passion and prejudice.
Undue influence: There continue to be a relatively large numof cases involving undue influence. The general rule laid down
by the Kentucky court states that invalidity because of undue influence requires such influence as destroys the free agency of the
testator in his will.27 The case law continues to be rather strict in
adhering to this requirement.
In determining whether or not undue influence has been
exercised it is not enough to show merely that there was an opportunity to do so or a possibility that it was exercised. There
must be substantial evidence that it actually was exercised.28
In addition, there must be more than mere existence of confidential relations between the testator and a beneficiary. It is
necessary to submit evidence of activity or overt acts or incriminating statements, etc. 29
Where a will is unnatural in its provisions, such fact, when
unexplained and when corroborated by even slight evidence, is
sufficient to take to the jury the question of whether or not undue
influence was exerted. 30 Mere inequality in the testator's distribution of his estate is not alone sufficient to take a case to the jury.31
When a case gets to the jury, however, the latter may consider
the testator's age and evidence of physical weakness and enfeeble32
ment likely to impair his mind and powers of resistance.
Revocation and Lost Wills: The Kentucky Revised Statutes
provide that revocation of a will must be by subsequent will or
codicil, by some physical act such as cutting, tearing or destruction by the testator or by some person at his direction with the
- Hines v. Price, 310 Ky. 758, 221 S.W. 2d 673 (1949).
'Lynn v. Stratton, 809 Ky. 721, 218 S.W. 2d 962 (1949).
"Jackson v. Feldhaus, 318 Ky. 552, 238 S.W. 2d 109 (1950). Accord: Nunn
v. Williams, 254 S.W. 2d 698 (Ky. 1958).
'Bennett v. Kissinger, 313 Ky. 417, 231 S.W. 2d 74 (1950). Accord: Clark
v. Johnson, 268 Ky. 591, 105 S.W. 2d 576 (1937); Jones v. Beckley, 173 Ky. 831,
191 S.W. 627 (1917).
='Palmer v. Richardson, 311 Ky. 190, 223 S.W. 2d 745 (1949).
McKinney v. Montgomery, 248 S.W. 2d 719 (Ky. 1952).
Prichard v. Kitchen, 242 S.W. 2d 988 (Ky. 1951).
fHines v. Price, 310 Ky. 758, 221 S.W. 2d 673 Z1949).
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intent to revoke, or by certain well defined circumstances such as
subsequent marriage.33 One case involved partial revocation by
cutting, one involved a revocation by codicil, and several involved
the possibility of destruction when there was a lost will which
could not be produced, together with questions involving admission to probate.
Total versus partial revocation was the problem involved in
Flora v. Hughes,34 where there was a cutting of only one item
from the instrument. Item five, a bequest of $500, had been cut
or torn out and both pieces were found in the testatrix' safe deposit box. There was no evidence that anyone, other than the
testatrix, had tampered with the will or that it had been out of her
possession. The court affirmed the holding that the testatrix did
not intend to revoke the will in its entirety but only to eliminate
the one item.
Thornton v. Kirtley 5 was the case in which an invalid codicil
effectively destroyed a provision of the original will. The original
will contained a provision creating a trust of bank stock for the
testatrix' three children. The codicil, however, had the effect of
rendering the entire disposition invalid, for it attempted to amend
the original trust by suspending the power of alienation for a fifty
year period and thus was invalid under statute.36 Revocation of
the original trust and invalidity of the codicil caused the trust
property to pass to the three children in fee simple as on intestacy.
It was argued that the trust in the original will should be allowed
to stand by application of the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation since the intention would not have been to revoke by
codicil if the testatrix had known that the provision in the codicil
was invalid. The court, however, held the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation inapplicable since the codicirs change or revocation was not dependent upon any mistake, act or condition,
citing previous cases and articles in the Kentucky Law Journalby
Dean Evans and Mr. Woodson D. Scott.37 An earlier Kentucky
Blv. STAT. 894.080 (1953).
812 Ky. 478, 228 S.W. 2d 27 (1950).

'Ky.

"249 S.W. 2d 802 (Ky. 1952).
"Ky. BRv. STAT. 381.220 (1953).
Evans, Dependent Relative Revocation, 16 Ky. L. J. 251 (1928); Evans,
Testamentary Revocation by Act to the Document and Dependent Relative Revocation, 23 Ky. L. J. 559 (1935); Scott, The Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation in Kentucky, 16 Ky. L. J. 54 (1927).
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case 38 holding that the original provision remained unaffected by
a void codicil was distinguished in that there the codicil did not
amount to a revocation of the original provision. In the instant
case the modification of the original provision by the codicil was
substantial so that the contention that the testatrix would have

preferred the original provision to complete invalidity was unsuccessful.
Numerous recent cases follow the proposition that when a
lost will, the original of which is not produced, is offered for probate, the proponents have the burden of establishing the execution, its loss or misplacement, its contents, and the fact that it

continued to be recognized by the testator as his unrevoked will. 39
Adopted children: Two interesting cases involved the rights
of adopted children as "heirs" or "legal heirs", when those or
similar terms are used in a will.4" In both cases the testator had
left the property to the "heirs" of a child of the testator following
the death of such child, and in both cases adopted children of
such child were held within the beneficial disposition of the testator's usage of the term "heirs." Had the testator, instead of the
word "heirs," used the word "children" in describing the persons
to take following death of the first beneficiary, adopted children
would have been left out, according to the Kentucky cases so
far decided. 41 It is, however, quite arguable that a testamentary
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Douglas' Trustee, 134 Ky. 374,
120 S.W. 328 (1909).
'Noland v. Turley, 255 S.W. 2d 495 (Ky. 1953) (allowed copy of lost will
to be probated); Watson v. Watson, 245 S.W. 2d 586 (Ky. 1952) (testimony of
daughter, not a devisee, that she had burned the will should have been admitted);
Hall's Ex'r v. Haynes, 247 S.W. 2d 45 (Ky. 1952) (allowed a lost or concealed
holographic will to be probated-one of the beneficiaries had made a copy and
the contents were established by several witnesses to whom the will had been
shown); Loy v. Loy, 246 S.W. 2d 578 (Ky. 1952) (mere declarations of the
testator were held insufficient to establish lost will as the valid, unrevoked will of
testator); Epley v. Epley, 251 S.W. 2d 459 (Ky. 1952) (Court upheld dismissal
of petition based upon allegation that husband and wife had executed a joint will
pursuant to an agreement to leave property to the plaintiff after the death of
both the husband and wife, because the petition failed to allege that the husband
continued to recognize the will up to the time of his death); White v. Brannan's
Adm'r, 307 Ky. 776, 212 S.W. 2d 299, 3 A.L.R. 2d 943 (1948) (testimony of
scrivener of lost will, an attorney of considerable repute, that the will was duly
executed in accordance with the laws of the state sufficiently established execution
of the will).
'Isaacs v. Manning, 312 Ky. 326, 227 S.W. 2d 418 (1950), noted 39 Ky.
L. J. 335 (1951); Major v. Kammer, 258 S.W. 2d 506 (Ky. 1953), noted infra
this volume, 42 Ky. L. J. 700 (1954).
'Kolb v. Ruhl's Adm'r, 303 Ky. 604, 198 S.W. 2d 326 (1946); McLeod v.
Andrews, 303 Ky. 46, 198 S.W. 2d 473 (1946); Copeland v. State Bank & Trust
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gift to the "children" of the testator himself would have included
adopted children. Distinctions have been sought to be made,
turning upon whether the adoption was prior to or subsequent
to the will or upon whether a will or some other instrument is
involved. These and other distinctions are
discussed in two re42
cent notes in the Kentucky Law Journal.

Afterborn children: Kentucky's pretermitted child statute was
recently applied for the protection of unmentioned children born
after the execution of the will.43 The Journalnoted a novel situa-

tion which arose in an Illinois case, involving the question whether
the fact that the wife was known to be pregnant at the time of
execution of the will showed an intention to disinherit the subsequently born child to prevent the statute from operating. 44
Lapse: The Kentucky lapse statute is somewhat unusual in
that it provides that a gift lapsed for failure of the beneficiary to
outlive the testator will pass under the laws governing intestate
distribution unless the testator manifests an intention that the
property shall pass under the residuary clause. 45 Recent litigation
involved the question of when such intention can be found from
language in a will and the surrounding circumstances, and is discussed in a note in this issue.46 The same rule applies to the share
of a deceased residuary legatee who was to share the residuary
estate with the other residuary legatees. The statutory rule overrides any presumption against intestacy and prevents the surviving residuary legatees from taking the lapsed portion against
the heirs at law.
Co., 300 Ky. 432, 188 S.W. 2d 420 (1945), discussed 39 Ky. L. J. 335, 337
(1951); Parke v. Parke's Ex'r, 295 Ky. 634, 175 S.W. 2d 141 (1943); Sanders v.
Adams, 278 Ky. 24, 128 S.W. 2d 223 (1939). Cf. the holding that subsequently
adopted children are not included within benefit of word "heirs" used in a deed
of gift, Woods v. Crump, 283 Ky. 675, 142 S.W. 2d 680 (1940), 29 Ky. L. J. 481
(1941).
"Cox, Adopted Child as "Legal Heir" under Will, 39 Ky. L. J. 335 (1951);
see also a note infra this issue, Youngblood, Adopted Child as "Heir," 42 Ky. L. J.
700 (1954).
4
Mann v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 256 S.W. 2d 489 (Ky. 1953).
" Tulkoff, Failureto Mention Afterborn Children in Will Made while Wife Is
Pregnantas Showing Intent to Disinherit,41 Ky. L. J. 357 (1952), noting Hedlund
v. Minor, 395 IMI.217, 69 N.E. 2d 862 (1946).
"Ky. Ray. STAT. 394.500 (1953).
" Cundiff v. Schmitt, 243 S.W. 2d 667 (Ky. 1951), noted infra this issue, 42
Ky. L. J. 688 (1954).
" Schonberg v. Lodenkemper's Ex'r, 314 Ky. 105, 234 S.W. 2d 501 (1950).
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Construction:Although judicial determination of testators intention with respect to substantive property rights created by
will is sometimes classified as a problem of will construction, cases
of this sort are not treated extensively in this article because they
are quite numerous and also because the court's decision usually
turns on the application of legal principles involving the law of
future interests or trusts. Many of the important "wills" cases of
this sort decided during the period have been treated in a recent
article on Kentucky Decisions on Future Interests (1938-53) by
Professor W. Lewis Roberts (Supra, this volume, p. 3.) Other
cases dealing specifically with the construction which the Court
of Appeals will give to a gift over following an attempted devise
or bequest of a fee simple will be treated in another article now
in preparation.
PART II
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUON

Qualificationsand Appointment of Administrators: This subject is discussed in an article, supra this issue, entitled "Statutory
Right to Administer Assets," by Mr. Pierce Lively. One recent
case might be cited here wherein deceased's husband was denied
the right to act as coadministrator of his wife's estate on the
ground that he had a substantial interest antagonistic to that of
the heirs and legatees. 8
Powers, duties and liabilities of administrators:In Johnson v.
Ducobu 9 expenses incurred in a suit against the administrator
for settlement of the estate were denied upon a showing that a
major portion of the assets had been distributed before filing of
action, and the action itself, in addition to being fruitless, appeared to have been wholly unnecessary.
For failure to report the estate for federal taxes or to cause
inheritance taxes to be paid the executor was held personally
liable in Sanford v. Sanfords Adm'r.50 In another recent case no
misconduct on the part of the administratrix was found on the
facts presented."1
" Cosby v. Hays, 257 S.W. 2d 575 (Ky. 1953).
'"258 S.W. 2d 509 (Ky. 1953).
'0262 S.W. 2d 827 (Ky. 1953).
' Miller v. Miller's Adm'x, 261 S.W. 2d 293 (1958).
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Claims against the estate: In Quin v. Quin 2 a claim for payments was disallowed where it appeared that a voluntary gift was
intended. In Franklin v. Franklin55 the court stated that an administrator will be permitted to offset his legitimate expenses
against the amount for which he is liable for failure to account,
even though such payments were designated in his final settlement as donations. Other recent cases in this area of the law include Benjamin v. Goif5 and Murphy v. Henry.55
Adopted children: A small segment of Kentucky's descent and
distribution laws has been affected by the recent enactment of
the new provisions governing adoption of children. A section in
the 1950 adoption statute repeals the provision in the chapter on
descent and distribution relating to inheritance by and from
adopted children." The new provision in effect goes all the
way in treating an adopted child the same as a natural child for
inheritance and succession purposes.
Previous statutory law that the adopted child may inherit
from the adoptive parents as well as from the adoptive parents'
collateral kin (in case there are no nearer relatives to preclude
him) is retained in substantially the same form. Added is a new
provision permitting the kin of the adoptive parents as well as
the adoptive parents themselves to share in the estate on death
of the adopted child. Unchanged is the previous law that an
adopted child is not prevented by the adoption from inheriting
his share in the estate of his natural parents, if any.
Under this statute regarding inheritance by adopted children,
the Court of Appeals has held, correctly it is believed, that when
an adopted child predeceases his adoptive parent the children of
the adopted child will take the share in his place. 57
Other changes made by the 1950 adoption statute are dis58
cussed in a previous article in the Journal.
- 259 S.W. 2d 23 (Ky. 1953).
t311 Ky. 276, 223 S.W. 2d 992 (1949).
3314 Ky. 639, 236 S.W. 2d 905 (1951) (holding that debt for a stallion fee
was not barred by the statute of limitations contained in Ky. REV. STAT. 376.400).
311 Ky. 799, 225 S.W. 2d 662 (1949) (upheld the compromise of a doubtful claim under a will).
' Ky. REV. STAT. 199.530, repealing Ky. RiV. STAT. 391.080.
'Bailey v. Wireman, 240 S.W. 2d 600 (Ky. 1951).
' Wetzel and Rosenbaun, Child Welfare and Public Assistance, 39 Ky. L. J.
28 (1950).
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Disqualificationfrom inheriting:Perhaps the most interesting
development in the descent and distribution rules of Kentucky
arose on a question of interpretation of the statute preventing one
convicted of felonious homicide from sharing in the estate of his
victim. In Bates v. Wilson 9 the question was whether the child
of the convicted killer (a son of decedent) was also prevented
from taking her share in the victim's estate. Although the murderer was himself barred by his conviction, the court nevertheless
permitted the only child of the murderer to take the share which
he would have taken had he not been convicted.
Had the murderer been considered as being alive at the decedent's death, it is difficult to see how more remote kin such as a
child of the murderer could share in the estate. The scant case
law bearing upon similar statutes would deny the child of the
murderer, also the grandchild of intestate, any standing as heir
in view of the fact that the murderer was still living and was of
nearer relationship. 0 The Kentucky court, however, by judicial
interpretation was able to read into the statute an intention that
the person convicted of killing the intestate "shall be considered
as though he had preceded in death the person he killed.""
Even considering the killer to have predeceased the victim,
another logical difficulty to permitting the child to share could
arise, in that there was another son of the victim living and it
would seem that the child would have to take through his parent,
the killer. One aspect of the doctrine of representation might
fasten upon the child the same disabilities as his parent. 62 Nevertheless, in limiting the penalty of the statute to disinherit only the
murderer himself, the Kentucky court reaches a less harsh result
than contrary case holdings. In effect, this interpretation avoids
attaint of the blood of the slayer. Admittedly the statute did intend to change the common law, 3 and to accomplish its purpose
'313 Ky. 572, 232 S.W. 2d 837 (1950), criticized 39 Ky. L. J. 496 (1951),
approved ATKINSON ON WLS 156 (2d ed. 1953).
' In re Norton's Estate, 175 Ore. 115, 151 P. 2d 719, 156 A.L.R. 617 (1944).
039
Ky. L. J. 496 at 498 (1951).
62
ATK SON ON WmLs 72 (2d ed. 1953).
The common law rule was that the killer could inherit from the estate of
his victim, for to hold otherwise would be to permit a common law principle (that
a wrongdoer shall not be allowed to profit by his own wrong) to destroy a
statutory right [of inheritance]. Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487
(1916).
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it seems unnecessarily harsh to extend its provisions to the child
of the wrongdoer in addition to the wrongdoer himself.
Another case under the statute, stemming from the same
facts as the one above, invalidated an attempted avoidance by
the device of a mortgage executed by the slayer prior to his conviction on the victim's realty to secure fees of the attorneys who
were defending his prosecution."'
Advancements: Another case, Popplewell v. Flanagan,65 involved determination of what transfers made by an intestate decedent to his children during his lifetime are advancements as
well as some interesting angles on the problem of valuation of
the property transferred. Familiar law was reaffirmed to the effect
that such transfers to constitute advancements must be made
with a "view to a portion or settlement in life," which prevented
from being advancements the gifts upon marriage, payments of
hospital bills and maintenance of children and grandparents, and
a $500 check to a helpful daughter. Recognizing the familiar
principle that when property is transferred by way of advancement its valuation should be taken as of the date of the transfer,
the court discussed difficulties in several possible ways of valuation of the transferred property when a portion of the product
therefrom was reserved for the lifetime of another person.
Surviving spouse's share: During the five year period several
cases construed different phases of the widow's dower rights. In
one the existing Kentucky rule that statutory dower means onethird of the gross, rather than merely net, rents in real property
was followed;(7 and in another the court could not find sufficient

testamentary intention to entitle the widow to dower rights in addition to her benefits under the will, but held she must instead
renounce the will or be confined to the will's bounty. s
One case involved a difficult problem of apportionment of the
dower interest in oil and gas royalties paid into court, as well as
future rolayties. 9 During the five year period the Kentucky Law
" Wilson v. Bates, 318 Ky. 853, 231 S.W. 2d 39 (1950).
'244 S.W. 2d 445 (Ky. 1951).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 391.140 (1953).
Frasure v. Martin, 247 S.W. 2d 51 (Ky. 1952).
Mann v. Peoples-Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 256 S.W. 2d 489 (Ky. 1953).
Yost v. Ratliff, 246 S.W. 2d 447 (Ky. 1951) (the lessee of oil and gas rights
was permitted to bring a bill of interpleader in equity to determine the apportion-
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Journalpublished an extensive study dealing with the interests in
land subject to dower in Kentucky.70
Several cases mention the surviving spouse's right to quarantine, or occupancy of the "mansion house" pending assignment
of dower or curtesy. Denial of the right was ordered where the
widow was not living with her husband, the decedent, on the
property as a residence at the time of his death,7' and was granted,
free from rents and other charges, when the statutory requisites
72
existed.
Emblements: The statute73 entitling the personal representative to the growing crops which are severed before the end of the
calendar year from the lands of a decedent who dies after March
1st was construed not to deprive the widow, as the one in possession of the homestead property for life, to the use of the corn
crop as against those entitled to the remainder.7 4 Had there been
debts the statutory requirement would have compelled the widow,
as executrix, to apply the crops to the debts, but the statutory intent was not to deprive her of any of the product of the land as
against remaindermen.
Conclusion
While most of the recent Kentucky cases fit well into the
existing pattern of the law, the litigation on wills and intestate
distribution continues to be heavy. In view of the fact that there
have been no very startling developments in this field, the purpose of this article has been to collect and bring together in compact form the recent cases and articles dealing with current litigation.
ment). On the subject of the right of the widow to dower in oil and gas leases,
see notes, Right of the Widow of Lessee in Oil and Gas Leases-Van Camp v.
Evans, 87 Ky. L. J. 204, 208 (1949).
"0Blair, Interests in Land Subject to Dower in Kentucky, 39 Ky. L .J. 120
(1950).
' Frasure v. Martin, supra note 67.
'Johnson v. Docubu, 251 S.W. 2d 992 (Ky. 1952).
'Ky. REV. STAT. 395.350 (1) (1953).
Miller's Ex'rs v .Miller, 310 Ky. 721, 221 S.W. 2d 654 (1949).
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